Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
| |||
|
| |||
| Ersatz world, philosophy: expression from David Lewis for possible worlds which consist only of sets of sentences, as opposed to worlds (different from our actual world) that are really existing. Other authors such as S. A. Kripke believe, unlike D. Lewis, that possible worlds do not really exist but are only construed for theoretical reasons. See also ersatzism, modal realism, possible worlds, metaphysics, necessity, essentialism, telescope theory._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
| Author | Concept | Summary/Quotes | Sources |
|---|---|---|---|
|
Hartry Field on Ersatz Worlds - Dictionary of Arguments
I 226 Ersatz worlds resp. "Ersatz individuals"/Field: i.e. in Stalnaker's way of speaking: "To show how the world could be or could have been". That is, maximally determined properties that an individual might have or might have had in the universe. This can be used to define cross-world congruence. Cf. >Cross world identity. Then "Ersatz matter particles" are properties! Then "congruent" and "between" are higher-order predicates that are applied to properties. >Properties, >Predicates, >Second order logic, >Description levels/Field. Whereby xP is also an ersatz particle, one that is instantiated in the real world by the normal particle x. x is a normal particle, but the "ersatz particle" that corresponds to it, and by which conge and bete are defined, is a property, a "way like x could be" and actually a way how x is up to date. ((s) Ersatz-individual: here not a particular but a property, a "way".) Field: but this does not help relativism (the thesis that empty space is possible) either. >Relativism, >Relationism, cf. >Substantivalism._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich, Aldershot 1994 |
||
> Counter arguments against Field
> Counter arguments in relation to Ersatz Worlds
Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-27